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INTRODUCTION
Defendants paint a picture of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(the “Act”) as a common-sense constitutionally sound system which will “stem a
crisis in the health care market that has threatened the vitality of the U.S.
economy.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 16). However, when the layers of glossy paint are
peeled away what remains below the rhetoric is a rotten law, which, if allowed to
stand, would undermine the very notion of limited government and enumerated
powers of Congress. The Administration insists that Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005) supplanted United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) as controlling precedent for the scope of the
Commerce Clause, ignoring the fact that the Raich plaintiffs conceded that
Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the underlying
statute. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. Defendants also fail to address the fact that the
Individual and Employer Mandates will not provide a guaranteed reduction in the
number of uninsured Americans or that the penalty for failing to purchase
insurance will not create revenue that will help reduce the number of uninsured
Americans. The Administration presumes that everyone who does not have health
insurance does not pay his medical bills and that everyone who has health
insurance pays every cent of his health care expenses and will never face financial
problems related to medical expenses. (Appellees‟ Brief, at 51, “The Act will
1
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protect people like plaintiffs from the risk of being left destitute by catastrophic
medical expenses”). None of these premises is factually or legally supportable,
leaving Defendants with no foundation for their claims that the Mandates are
constitutionally valid exercises of Congress‟ enumerated powers. Defendants offer
no analysis of the problems posed by the Mandates‟ infringement upon Plaintiffs‟
fundamental rights, choosing instead to simply dismiss those claims out of hand.
Defendants‟ cavalier attitude toward Plaintiffs‟ First Amendment and Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) claims does not erase the very significant
infringement upon fundamental rights embodied within the Mandate provisions.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANTS’ ATTEMPT TO
JUSTIFY CONGRESS’ UNPRECEDENTED EXPANSION OF THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE.
A.

Defendants Cannot Shoehorn The Individual Mandate
Within The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause Decisions.

Faced with the unprecedented expansion of Congress‟ Commerce Clause
authority posed by the Mandates, Defendants use linguistic sleight of hand to try to
convince this Court that the Mandates‟ unsupportable intrusion into the private
financial affairs of Americans is nothing more than an extension of Congress‟
long-standing oversight of the interstate insurance and health care markets.
Defendants use feats of logical sleight of hand to try to convince this Court that the
Mandates will, inter alia, cure the ailing health care system, make health insurance
2
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more available and affordable and save Americans from economic devastation
brought on by catastrophic medical bills. (Appellees‟ Brief at 28, 51). In reality,
however, the Mandates will not work the miracles promised by Defendants. When
the curtain is pulled back from Defendants‟ presentation and the faulty premises
upon which these conclusions are based are revealed, it is apparent that the
Mandates are not cure-alls, but unprecedented power grabs that fall far outside of
the boundaries the Supreme Court has placed upon Congress‟ Commerce Clause
power.
1.

Defendants Cannot Use Raich To Bypass Lopez And
Morrison And Rely Upon Wickard.

Defendants continue to rely upon Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) as
controlling precedent for their conclusion that the Mandates are valid under the
Commerce Clause. By clinging to Raich, Defendants can attempt to return to the
expansive definition of the Commerce Clause under Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942) and by-pass the intervening narrowing of Congress‟ power under Lopez
and Morrison. Defendants‟ reliance upon Raich and Wickard is misplaced because
regulating the Raich plaintiffs‟ active growing and cultivating of medical
marijuana or Mr. Filburn‟s active growing and cultivating of wheat is not
analogous to Plaintiffs‟ inaction in failing to purchase health insurance. See Id. at
127-128; Raich, 525 U.S. at 22. More importantly, Raich is inapposite because it
did not involve a facial Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 23. In Raich the
3
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plaintiffs did not, as Plaintiffs do here, challenge Congress‟ authority to enact the
underlying statute. Id. at 15. “Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage
of the CSA [Controlled Substances Act], as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress‟ commerce power.” Id.
“Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority.” Id. Consequently, Raich did
not, as Defendants claim, effectively overrule Lopez and Morrison and re-establish
the broadened definition of the Commerce Clause announced in Wickard. Raich‟s
conclusion that “when Congress decides that the total incidence of a practice poses
a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class” must be understood
as referring to the Raich plaintiffs‟ request to excise their economic activity from a
concededly valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, not, as Defendants claim, an
expansion of Commerce Clause authority. Defendants‟ failure to recognize that
distinction renders their conclusion that the Mandates are valid under Raich
untenable. The distinctions between Raich, this case and the most recent Supreme
Court cases analyzing facial Commerce Clause challenges, i.e., Lopez and
Morrison, mean that Defendants‟ attempt to resurrect the pre-Lopez expansive
definition of the Commerce Clause under Wickard is unavailing, leaving
Defendants with Lopez and Morrison as controlling precedent. But even Wickard
and Raich cannot save the Act, because both these cases involved active growing
4
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and consumption; whereas here Plaintiffs are doing absolutely nothing. The
Wickard and Raich plaintiffs were reached by regulation because of their voluntary
activity, but the Act here seeks to reach Plaintiffs merely because they lawfully
exist.
When viewed under the more limiting standards of Lopez and Morrison, the
individual Mandates fall far outside the permissible limits of Congress‟ power to
regulate interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (accepting the
defendants‟ arguments would convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the states). Defendants try
to escape that conclusion by engaging in semantic gymnastics aimed at recasting
the non-economic inactivity of not purchasing health insurance as an economic
activity suitable for congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
Defendants portray the Mandates as regulating “the means of payment for services
in the interstate health care market,” preventing “the consumption of health care
services without payment,” restricting “the shifting of costs to other market
participants” and comporting with “broad principles of economic practicality”
under which this Court is urged to overlook the fact that through the Mandates
Congress is, for the first time, seeking to regulate non-economic inactivity.
(Appellees‟ Brief at 24, 40, 41). No matter how Defendants portray the Mandates,
the truth is that Congress is compelling Americans who have chosen not to engage
5
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in commerce to become active market participants by purchasing a governmentdefined health insurance policy or paying a penalty. There is no legal precedent for
such an intrusion into the private financial affairs of American citizens.
Even Wickard, which upheld the regulation of the private economic activity
of growing wheat, and Raich, which upheld the regulation of the private economic
activity of growing medical marijuana, did not reach as far as Congress is seeking
to reach here. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128, Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. In each of those
cases, the Court found that the economic activities engaged in by the plaintiffs
were sufficiently connected to interstate commerce to warrant congressional
regulation.1 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128, Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. By contrast,
possessing a gun near a school and committing a violent crime against a female are
not subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause because their
relationship to economic activity is too attenuated. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-568
(possession of a gun near a school); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (violent crime
against women). Similarly, Plaintiffs‟ inaction regarding health insurance is
dissimilar to the taking of red wolves on private land that this Court held is
Again, it should be emphasized that in Raich the plaintiffs conceded that
Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Controlled
Substances Act, but were seeking a special “carve out” exception for medical
marijuana grown in California. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. Plaintiffs do not concede
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Mandates,
making Raich wholly inapposite. However, if Raich were applicable, the economic
activity of planting, raising and cultivating medical marijuana would distinguish it
from this case.
6
1
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“regulable economic and commercial activity as understood by current Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.” Gibbs v. Babbitt 214 F.3d 483, 492-493 (4th Cir. 2000).
Unlike Plaintiffs‟ inaction here, the conduct regulated in Gibbs involved voluntary
actions, i.e., the taking of wolves, for commercial and economic benefit, i.e.,
protection of valuable livestock and crops, in a way that affected interstate
commerce, i.e. tourism, trade and research. Id.
Neither Defendants‟ newly minted characterizations of the Mandates nor
their recitation of statistics, opinions and conclusions from scholarly articles and
congressional reports (none of which is in evidence and most of which is
inadmissible) alters the conclusion that the Mandates far exceed the boundaries
that the Supreme Court has placed on Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority.
2.

Defendants’ Contention That The “Uniqueness” Of
The Health Care Market Warrants Congress’
Expansion of the Commerce Clause Is Unsupportable.

Defendants build their defense of the Mandates upon a claim that the health
care market is somehow “unique” so that Congress is justified in extending its
Commerce Clause power to, for the first time, compel people to purchase a product
or be penalized. Judge Vinson of the Northern District of Florida cogently revealed
the fallacy of that argument in his opinion that declared the Individual Mandate
unconstitutional and determined that it was not severable from the Act so that the

7

Case: 10-2347

Document: 79

Date Filed: 03/04/2011

Page: 14

entire Act is unconstitutional.2 State of Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011). Judge Vinson persuasively refuted the
same issues Defendants have raised in this case, including that Plaintiffs cannot
“opt out” of health care, that hospitals are legally required to provide emergency
care and that unpaid medical costs are shifted to third parties. Id. at *18-*25.
The defendants contend that there are three unique elements of the
health care market which, when viewed cumulatively and in
combination, belie the claim that the uninsured are inactive. First, as
living and breathing human beings who are always susceptible to
sudden and unpredictable illness and injury, no one can “opt out” of
the health care market. Second, if and when health services are
sought, hospitals are required by law to provide care, regardless of
inability to pay. And third, if the costs incurred cannot be paid (which
they frequently cannot, given the high cost of medical care), they are
passed along (cost-shifted) to third parties, which has economic
implications for everyone. Congress found that the uninsured received
approximately $43 billion in “uncompensated care” in 2008 alone.
These three things, according to the defendants and various health
care industry experts and scholars on whom they rely, are “replicated
in no other market” and defeat the argument that uninsured
individuals are inactive.
First, it is not at all clear whether or why the three allegedly
unique factors of the health care market are Constitutionally
significant. What if only one of the three factors identified by the
defendants is present? After all, there are lots of markets–especially if
defined broadly enough–that people cannot “opt out” of. For example,
everyone must participate in the food market. Instead of attempting to
control wheat supply by regulating the acreage and amount of wheat a
2

Plaintiffs realize that Judge Vinson‟s opinion is not binding on this Court,
but offers his reasoned analysis as a response to Defendants‟ recurring reference to
the purported uniqueness of the health care market as a justification for the
Mandates. The Florida case addresses only the Individual Mandate, but Judge
Vinson‟s analysis is equally apropos for the Employer Mandate.
8
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farmer could grow as in Wickard, under this logic, Congress could
more directly raise too-low wheat prices merely by increasing demand
through mandating that every adult purchase and consume wheat
bread daily, rationalized on the grounds that because everyone must
participate in the market for food, non-consumers of wheat bread
adversely affect prices in the wheat market. Or, as was discussed
during oral argument, Congress could require that people buy and
consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required
purchases will positively impact interstate commerce, but also
because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus
more productive and put less of a strain on the health care system.
Similarly, because virtually no one can be divorced from the
transportation market, Congress could require that everyone above a
certain income threshold buy a General Motors automobile–now
partially government-owned–because those who do not buy GM cars
(or those who buy foreign cars) are adversely impacting commerce
and a taxpayer-subsidized business.
I pause here to emphasize that the foregoing is not an irrelevant and
fanciful “parade of horribles.” Rather, these are some of the serious
concerns implicated by the individual mandate that are being
discussed and debated by legal scholars. For example, in the course of
defending the Constitutionality of the individual mandate, and
responding to the same concerns identified above, often-cited law
professor and dean of the University of California Irvine School of
Law Erwin Chemerinsky has opined that although “what people
choose to eat well might be regarded as a personal liberty” (and thus
unregulable), “Congress could use its commerce power to require
people to buy cars.” See ReasonTV, Wheat, Weed, and Obamacare:
How the Commerce Clause Made Congress All-Powerful, August 25,
2010, available at: http:// reason.tv/video/show/wheat-weed-andobamacare-how-t. When I mentioned this to the defendants‟ attorney
at oral argument, he allowed for the possibility that “maybe Dean
Chemerinsky is right.” See Tr. at 69. Therefore, the potential for this
assertion of power has received at least some theoretical consideration
and has not been ruled out as Constitutionally implausible.3

3

This directly counters Defendants‟ contention that Plaintiffs‟ similar
illustrations regarding the consequences of adopting Defendants expansive view of
9
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Id. at *23-*24.
In alluding to these same general concerns, another court has observed
that requiring advance purchase of health insurance based on a future
contingency that will substantially affect commerce could also “apply
to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions. This broad
definition of the economic activity subject to congressional regulation
lacks logical limitation and is unsupported by Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.” See Virginia[v Sebelius], supra, 728 F.Supp.2d [768]
at 781 [(E.D. Va. 2010)].
Id. at *25. Judge Vinson added:
[T]he contention that Commerce Clause power should be upheld
merely because the government and its experts or scholars claim that
it is being exercised to address a „particularly acute‟ problem that is
„singular [ ],‟ „special,‟ and „rare‟–that is to say „unique‟–will not by
itself win the day. Uniqueness is not an adequate limiting principle as
every market problem is, at some level and in some respects, unique.
If Congress asserts power that exceeds its enumerated powers, then it
is unconstitutional, regardless of the purported uniqueness of the
context in which it is being asserted.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, under Lopez the causal link
between what is being regulated and its effect on interstate commerce
cannot be attenuated and require a court “to pile inference upon
inference,” which is, in my view, exactly what would be required to
uphold the individual mandate. For example, in contrast to individuals
who grow and consume marijuana or wheat (even in extremely small
amounts), the mere status of being without health insurance, in and of
itself, has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce
(not “slight,” “trivial,” or “indirect,” but no impact whatsoever)–at
least not any more so than the status of being without any particular
good or service. If impact on interstate commerce were to be
expressed and calculated mathematically, the status of being
uninsured would necessarily be represented by zero. Of course, any
other figure multiplied by zero is also zero. Consequently, the impact
must be zero, and of no effect on interstate commerce. The uninsured
Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority are mere “rhetoric” which should be
dismissed as meaningless. (Appellees‟ Brief at 49-51)
10
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can only be said to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce in
the manner as described by the defendants: (i) if they get sick or
injured; (ii) if they are still uninsured at that specific point in time;
(iii) if they seek medical care for that sickness or injury; (iv) if they
are unable to pay for the medical care received; and (v) if they are
unable or unwilling to make payment arrangements directly with the
health care provider, or with assistance of family, friends, and
charitable groups, and the costs are thereafter shifted to others. In my
view, this is the sort of piling “inference upon inference” rejected in
Lopez, supra, 514 U.S. at 567, and subsequently described in
Morrison as “unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution‟s
enumeration of powers.” Supra, 529 U.S. at 615.
Id. at *25-*26. “In short, the defendants‟ argument that people without health
insurance are actively engaged in interstate commerce based on the purported
“unique” features of the much broader health care market is neither factually
convincing nor legally supportable.” Id. at *27. Defendants cannot make an
unconstitutional law constitutional merely because they allege a crisis is looming
or conjure up a parade of horribles. Nor can the purported good intention of
making healthcare available and affordable make a bad law good. When all the
rhetoric and mathematical magic fades, we are left with the basic question of
whether Congress has the authority to force inactive citizens to purchase a
government-defined product or pay a penalty. The answer is a simple “No!”
3.

Defendants Cannot Use The Deference Accorded To
Congressional Findings To Justify Congress’ Coercive
Intrusion Into Private Financial Matters.

Defendants also attempt to justify Congress‟ unprecedented reach into the
private financial lives of lawful citizens by alluding to the usual deference
11
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accorded Congress‟ choice of the means used to attain the end of regulating
interstate commerce. (Appellees‟ Brief, at 32-33). “Governing precedent leaves no
room for plaintiffs‟ invitation to override Congress‟ judgment about the
appropriate means to achieve its legitimate objectives.” Id. at 32. Defendants argue
this Court should merely look at “whether the means chosen are „reasonably
adapted‟ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power‟ or under
other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.” Id.
at 32 (citing United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010)). Not
surprisingly, Defendants conclude that the Mandates are reasonable means to attain
Congress‟ goal of ameliorating “a crisis in the health care market that has
threatened the vitality of the U.S. economy.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 16). In fact,
however, the Mandates do nothing to address the problems Congress sought to
address. Even if the ends Congress sought in enacting the Act were legitimate
objectives under the Commerce Clause (which they are not), the means enacted to
address them cannot meet even Defendants‟ ultra-deferential rational relationship
test.4

4

Plaintiffs do not agree with Defendants‟ characterization of the appropriate
standard for review of congressional enactments. Defendants overstate the
deference accorded to legislative findings in support of legislation. Following
Defendants‟ position would make this Court little more than a rubber stamp for
anything members of Congress might come up with to attempt to justify
legislation. The Supreme Court has specifically rejected such a standard. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 614. “Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce
12

Case: 10-2347

Document: 79

Date Filed: 03/04/2011

Page: 19

Defendants have imbued the Mandates with attributes that are not present in
the Act. The Mandates cannot deliver the results promised by Defendants and are
not reasonable means to meet the ends described in the Act, even if those ends
were legitimate. Defendants claim that “the minimum coverage provisions” will
“prevent health care consumers from waiting to buy insurance until they are sick or
injured.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 30). In fact, there is nothing in the Mandates to
prevent such last-minute purchases. Section 1501 of the Act provides that
individuals must demonstrate that they have health insurance which meets the
government‟s definition of “minimum essential coverage” or pay a penalty. 26
U.S.C. §5000A. Section 1513 of the Act dictates that, with limited exceptions,
employers must offer employees health insurance coverage that meets what the
government determines to be “minimum essential coverage” at what the
government determines is affordable or pay significant penalties. 26 U.S.C.
§4980H. Under either provision, individuals or employers could pay the penalty
and decide to not purchase health insurance at all, or purchase health insurance
only when they get sick or injured and be in compliance with the law. Defendants
claim that the Mandates will prevent uninsured people from “externalizing” their

sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is
ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally
only by this Court.” Id. None of the cases cited by Defendants gives Congress
carte blanche to enact laws (including means and ends) which exceed their
enumerated powers. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring).
13
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costs. (Appellees‟ Brief at 34). Again, this is based upon the faulty premise that the
Mandates will result in every individual being covered by health insurance when
the Mandates merely provide that individuals purchase insurance or pay a penalty.
According to Defendants, the Mandates will ensure that those who use health care
services “will not add to the staggering burden of uncompensated health care
costs.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 50). This assertion is based upon the faulty premise
that every person who is not presently insured will become insured under the
Mandates, when in fact the provisions only require a choice between an insurance
policy and paying a penalty. If an individual decides to pay the penalty, which is
not designated to be applied to purchasing insurance, then he could still remain
uninsured and perhaps fail to pay for health care services. Defendants‟ statement is
built upon the further fallacy that everyone who does not purchase health insurance
does not pay for his health care costs through other means and thereby shifts the
burden of his health care unto those who have insurance. Defendants offer no
evidence to support the proposition that those who do not have health insurance do
not pay their medical bills while those with insurance pay every penny. Finally,
Defendants claim that the Mandates guarantee that people like plaintiffs will be
protected from the risk of being “left destitute by catastrophic medical expenses.”
(Appellees‟ Brief at 51, citing statistic that 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies
are caused in part by medical expenses). This conclusion builds upon the fallacies
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that every uninsured person will have health insurance and that everyone who does
not purchase health insurance does not pay his medical bills, and adds another
fallacy that those who have health insurance will have 100 percent of all medical
costs paid for so that they will never face significant medical costs that could
create financial hardship.
Neither the words of the Mandates nor any of the scholarly opinions and
reports cited by Defendants support their conclusion that the Mandates will solve
economic problems associated with health care costs, increase supply and demand
for health insurance, and decrease the number of uninsured Americans.
Defendants‟ logically unsupportable arguments are wholly inadequate to justify
Congress‟ unprecedented expansion of the Commerce Clause.
4.

Other Governmental Regulatory Schemes Are Not
Analogous To Congress’ Unprecedented Attempt To
Compel Participation in Commerce.

Defendants attempt to defend the unprecedented expansion of Commerce
Clause authority by pointing to examples of what they believe are analogous
regulations of passive conduct and claiming that the Mandates are merely logical
extensions of those regulations.5 The cited statutory schemes are not analogous,
however, and only serve to emphasize the unprecedented nature of Congress‟
5

This argument seems to contradict Defendants‟ argument that the health care
market is “unique.” If it is unique, then these comparisons to other industries
should be irrelevant.
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attempt to compel citizens to purchase a product and penalize those who refuse.
Defendants cite two statutory provisions, The Second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 38, 1
Stat. 264, and federal laws regulating child pornography, 18 U.S.C. §2252(c), as
examples of Congress regulating inactivity. However, neither statute supports the
proposition that Congress can force a person who has purposely not purchased a
product to purchase a government-defined product under threat of sanction. The
Second Militia Act was an early form of the draft, establishing that every male
between 18 and 45 was enrolled in the militia. 1 Stat. 264 at Section I. As part of
their responsibilities each man had to “provide himself” with the weapons and
supplies needed if he should be called into service. Id. The colonial-era law did not
require that all males purchase certain government-approved firearms from a third
party or pay a penalty, as the Mandates do here with regard to health insurance.
Moreover, this law had nothing to do with the Commerce Clause.
The child pornography statute penalizes “knowing possession, transmission,
or receipt” of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. §2252(c). Knowing possession,
transmission or receipt connotes an affirmative, deliberate action to acquire or
transmit something, wholly unlike Plaintiffs‟ failure to act to purchase health
insurance.
In Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935), the Supreme Court
found that Congress‟ power to control the currency included the ability to compel
16
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all of those who had gold bullion, coins and certificates to exchange them for paper
currency. As was true in Raich, the plaintiff in Nortz conceded that Congress had
the power to enact the underlying legislation, but wanted a specific ruling
regarding the amount of compensation to which he was entitled. Nortz, 294 U.S. at
328. While the statute in Nortz referred to compelling citizens to do something, it
did not, as the Mandates do here, compel those who had taken no action to take
action or pay a penalty. Id. The affected citizens in Nortz had voluntary engaged in
an economic transaction–acquiring gold bullion, coins, or certificates–and, as a
consequence, were subject to congressional regulation. Id. The Court did not say
that Congress could force those who did not own gold to purchase gold and then
trade it in for currency. Id. Neither can Congress here force Plaintiffs and others to
purchase a health insurance policy in order to become part of the insurance
industry regulated by Congress.
This Court‟s cases upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
(FACE) Act also do not support Defendants‟ argument that Congress can regulate
non-economic inactivity, but further illustrate that Congress‟ Commerce Clause
authority extends to activities which affect interstate commerce. American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d
575, 587-588 (4th Cir. 1997). In American Life League, this Court found that the
activities of violence, threats of force, and physical obstructions aimed at persons
17
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seeking or providing reproductive health services, while not themselves economic,
substantially affected the interstate commercial activities of abortion clinics to
warrant regulation under the Commerce Clause. American Life League, 47 F.3d at
647. In Hoffman, this Court re-examined the FACE Act in light of the Supreme
Court‟s decision in Lopez, and found that it did not attempt to regulate noneconomic inactivity as did the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez. Hoffman, 126
F.3d at 587.
FACE does not regulate the provision of reproductive health care.
Rather, it regulates the use of force, threat of force, or physical
obstruction to intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with persons
because they are or have been obtaining or providing reproductive
health care services. Although this regulated activity is not itself
commercial or economic in nature, it is closely connected with, and
has a direct and profound effect on, the interstate commercial market
in reproductive health care services. As the congressional reports
accompanying FACE make clear, several aspects of interstate
commerce are directly and substantially affected by the regulated
conduct.
Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized words are critical to the distinction drawn
by this Court, as they exemplify the essential differentiation between what can be
regulated under the Commerce Clause, i.e., voluntary and deliberate actions
encompassed in the words use, activity and conduct, and what cannot, i.e., inaction
such as being in possession of something (Lopez) or not purchasing a product (the
Mandates here). American Life League and Hoffman are further examples of the
long-standing proposition that the Commerce Clause can be used to regulate
18

Case: 10-2347

Document: 79

Date Filed: 03/04/2011

Page: 25

activities that affect interstate commerce. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“[T]hus
far in our Nation‟s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.” (emphasis
added)).
This Court‟s validation of prior property owner liability under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) also does not support Defendants‟ argument that the Mandates are a
logical extension of existing congressional regulation. Nurad, Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992). Nurad did not involve the
Commerce Clause, but analyzed the question of the extent of strict liability for the
disposal of hazardous materials on property. Id. This Court found that CERCLA
“plainly imposes liability on a party who owns a facility at the time hazardous
waste leaks from an underground storage tank on the premises.” Id. at 840. This
Court rejected the former owner‟s attempt to avoid liability by differentiating
between prior passive ownership of contaminated property and active present
ownership. Id. at 845. Under the view proffered by the prior owner, “an owner
could avoid liability simply by standing idle while an environmental hazard festers
on his property. Such an owner could insulate himself from liability by virtue of
his passivity, so long as he transfers the property before any response costs are
incurred.” Id. Such a result would be anomalous to Congress‟ purpose in enacting
19
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CERCLA. Id. at 845-846. While this Court rejected the concept of “passive”
versus “active” ownership, it did not, as Defendants imply, embrace the idea that
Congress can regulate non-economic inactivity. Property owners subject to
CERCLA are not inactive non-participants as are Plaintiffs here. Instead,
purchasing property and operating a business from which hazardous materials
leaked involves voluntary conduct that produces an economic benefit to the person
or industry. The prior property owner in Nurad voluntarily purchased a piece of
property, i.e., participated in an economic transaction, and held or used it in a way
that created economic benefit. Regardless of whether he actively deposited
hazardous materials on the land, he owned the land and realized profit from the
sale, and so was engaged in economic activity. By contrast, Plaintiffs here have not
voluntarily agreed to purchase health insurance from which they realize economic
benefit. Congress could not compel the parties in Nurad to purchase real property
in order to have them liable for contamination and it cannot compel Plaintiffs here
to purchase health insurance in order to regulate their personal spending choices.
Similarly, when the Supreme Court found that the Commerce Clause
permitted Congress to require local motels and restaurants to serve black
customers, it did not say that Congress could require that individuals purchase
motels and restaurants in order to increase the supply of facilities available to
blacks. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
20
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Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Consequently, these precedents do
not, as Defendants imply, support the position that Congress can require that
individuals purchase health insurance policies in order to increase the number of
insured Americans who can be regulated.
None of the statutory schemes Defendants offer as examples of Congress‟
power to regulate Plaintiffs‟ private financial affairs do what the Mandates do here
– compel citizens to engage in a government-defined financial transaction or be
penalized for failing to do so. Despite Defendants‟ best efforts to prove otherwise,
there simply is no precedent for the limitless expansion of the Commerce Clause
that is reflected in the Mandates.
5.

Defendants’ Blurring Of The Lines Between
Regulating Participants And Compelling Participation
Does Not Validate Congress’ Invalid Assertion Of
Authority In The Mandates.

In a further effort to blur the distinction between permissible and
impermissible Commerce Clause regulations, Defendants point to numerous
instances in which courts have upheld regulations of economic transactions in the
health care, health insurance and similar national industries. Defendants fail to
recognize the difference between regulating those who voluntarily engage in
economic transactions and compelling people who have not engaged in any
transactions to purchase a product so that they can be regulated.
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Defendants point to the fact that health insurance is sold by national or
regional companies that operate interstate and cover costs for supplies, drugs and
equipment shipped in interstate commerce, presumably implying that those
attributes justify compelling all individuals to participate in the industry.
(Appellees‟ Brief at 44). Of course, the mere existence of a national industry and
the mere existence of an individual who might someday partake in the industry
does not justify compelling the individual to participate at the risk of financial
penalty. Defendants state that Congress can regulate health care under the
Commerce Clause because diseases can spread rapidly so that people can suddenly
need health care services far from home, and consumers travel out of state to
receive health care services. (Appellees‟ Brief at 45). However, these hypothetical
possibilities do not give Congress authority to compel people to purchase a
government-defined health insurance policy or pay a penalty.
Defendants cite Hoffman and Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc.,
313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002) as evidence that this Court has held that Congress can
regulate “the cross-border challenges associated with health care and other
markets.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 47). In Freilich, this Court recognized that since
hospitals are regularly engaged in interstate commerce, performing services for
out-of-state patients and generating revenues from out-of-state sources, Congress
has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact statutes governing physician
22
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peer review. Freilich, 313 F.3d at 213. However, the fact that abortion clinics or
hospitals, which voluntarily engage in economic transactions, can be subject to
regulation does not support Defendants‟ conclusion that Congress can force
someone to engage in similar transactions so that they can be regulated. The mere
fact that individuals might someday use health care facilities regulated by federal
law does not provide Congress with the power to cast a regulatory net over those
individuals‟ private financial affairs.
Similarly, the fact that the Supreme Court has upheld national reforms for
interstate concerns in other industries does not create in Congress the power to
compel those who do not participate in the health insurance industry to participate
or be penalized. (Appellees‟ Brief at 47, citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (upholding the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act under the Commerce Clause); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Social
Security system as a national reform for problems associated with state-regulated
insurance)). It is undisputed that Congress can enact federal laws to provide
consistency and national reforms for interstate industries, including health
insurance, but that undisputed fact does not grant Congress the right to compel
citizens to become part of those industries against their will.
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Congress’ Long-standing Regulation Of Employers Who Voluntarily
Provide Insurance Benefits To Employers Does Not Grant Congress
The Right To Compel Employers To Offer Government-Defined
Benefits That The Government Defines As Affordable.
Defendants cavalierly dismiss Plaintiffs‟ challenges to the Employer

Mandate by referring to the various statutes under which Congress has regulated
the content and availability of group health insurance plans offered by large
employers. (Appellees‟ Brief at 53). However, as Plaintiffs explained in their
Opening Brief, the fact that Congress can regulate employers who voluntarily
agree to offer health insurance and other benefits to their employees does not mean
that Congress can take the further step of requiring that employers offer health
insurance to their employees or pay a penalty, nor the further steps of defining
what coverage must be offered and whether the coverage is “affordable.”
(Appellants‟ Brief at 32-37).
Defendants entirely miss the point of the argument that regulation of wages
and hours under Darby and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) does not confer upon Congress the right to dictate what benefits will be
offered. Plaintiffs‟ argument is not that the Employer Mandate is unconstitutional
because it involves a contract with a third party, but because it seeks to assert the
authority to dictate that employers will offer certain benefits defined by the
government to their employees or be penalized. (Appellants‟ Brief, at 25-26).
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Defendants cannot cite a single case to support that unprecedented assertion of
authority.
II.

DEFENDANTS FAIL TO EFFECTIVELY REFUTE THE VALIDITY
OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS.
Defendants summarily dismiss Plaintiffs‟ First Amendment claims as

“insubstantial,” claiming that the Mandates “easily withstand rational basis
review.” (Appellees‟ Brief at 62). They base that conclusion upon their
unsubstantiated arguments that the Mandates regulate economic activity (“means
of payment for services obtained in the health care market”) and that Plaintiffs are
active participants in the health care market subject to congressional authority.
(Appellees‟ Brief at 62).
Defendants also offer the conclusory statement that the Mandates are neutral
laws of general applicability under Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) with no analysis of what those terms mean
and how the Mandates comport with the definition. As Plaintiffs explain in their
Opening Brief, the Mandates are the antithesis of neutral laws of general
applicability which do not survive strict scrutiny. (Appellants‟ Brief at 44-50).
Defendants attempt to defend the limited religious exemptions to the Mandates by
pointing to the court-approved Internal Revenue Code section upon which the
definition of exempted religious sects was based as if the approval of that provision
for income tax purposes made its terms immune from challenge in every other
25
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context. (Appellees‟ Brief at 60-61). As Plaintiffs explained in their Opening Brief,
merely alluding to the underlying I.R.C. section does not validate the exemptions
under the Constitution. (Appellants‟ Brief at 52-53).
Defendants do not even attempt to analyze Plaintiffs‟ Equal Protection,
Establishment Clause or RFRA claims. Their failure to address those claims is a
telling admission of their validity, and their silence waives any argument to the
contrary.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT AND PRESIDENT OBAMA HAVE
ESTABLISHED THAT THE MANDATES ARE PENALTIES, NOT
TAXES ENACTED PURSUANT TO CONGRESS’ POWER TO TAX
AND SPEND FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE.
Defendants devote considerable time to an issue that they admit was not

addressed by the district court nor raised by Plaintiffs in their appeal. Not only is
the issue of Congress‟ power to enact the Mandates under the Taxing and Spending
Clause not before this Court, but both the district court and President Obama have
held that the Mandates are not taxes.
As Judge Vinson observed, to date, every court to consider the issue of
whether the payments for non-compliance with the Mandates is a tax or penalty
(even those that have ruled in favor of the federal government) has rejected
Defendants‟ argument that they are taxes. Florida v. H.H.S., 2011 WL 285683 at
*2, n.4 (citing Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2011 WL
223010, at *9-*12 (M.D.Pa. Jan.24, 2011); Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d
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768, 786-88 (E.D.Va. 2010); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, --- F.Supp.2d ----,
2010 WL 4860299, at *9-* 11 (W.D.Va. Nov.30, 2010); U.S. Citizens Assoc. v.
Sebelius, ---F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 4947043, at *5 (N.D.Ohio Nov.22, 2010);
Thomas

More

Law

Center

v.

Obama,

720

F.Supp.2d

882,

890-91

(E.D.Mich.2010)).
More importantly, President Obama, the Act‟s chief proponent and the one
who signed the bill into law has emphatically stated that the payments are not
taxes. “For us to say you have to take responsibility to get health insurance is
absolutely not a tax increase,” and “Nobody considers that a tax increase.”
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/20/obama.health.care/index.html

(last

visited January 11, 2011). For Defendants to now claim that the payments are in
fact taxes, while perhaps convenient for trying to validate the law, is disingenuous
and contrary to established precedent. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs explained in their
Opening Brief, both Congress‟ reference to the payments as “penalties” while
using the term “taxes” elsewhere in the Act, along with the legislative history of
the Act, demonstrate that Congress clearly intended that the payments would be
penalties, not taxes. (Appellants‟ Brief, at 40-43). Therefore, this Court should
reject Defendants‟ invitations to 1. consider the issue and 2. hold that the payments
are taxes.
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CONCLUSION
The Individual and Employer Mandates are unprecedented extensions of
Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority that are legally and factually insupportable.
The Mandates violate Plaintiffs First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights and
rights under RFRA.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court‟s order and
find that the Mandates are unconstitutional.
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